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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of jobs reservation on improving the economic 
opportunities to persons belonging to India‟s Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled 
Tribes (ST). Using employment data from the 55
th
 NSS round  we estimate  the 
probabilities of different social groups in India being in one of three categories of 
economic status: own account workers; regular salaried or wage workers; casual wage 
labourers.  We use these probabilities to decompose the difference between group X 
and forward caste Hindus in the proportions of their members in regular salaried or 
wage employment.  This decomposition allows us to attribute a proportion of this 
difference to “attribute” differences” between group X and forward caste Hindus, the 
remainder being due to “coefficient” differences.  We measure the effects of positive 
discrimination in boosting the proportions of ST/SC persons in regular salaried 
employment and the discriminatory bias against Muslims who do not benefit from 
such policies.  We conclude that the boost provided by jobs reservation policies  was 
around 5 percentage points. We also conclude that an alternative, and more effective, 
way of raising the proportion of men, from the SC/ST groups, in regular salaried or 
wage employment would be to improve their employment-related attributes. 
                         
*
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at: the Institute for Economic Growth, Delhi; the 
Gokhale Institute, Pune; the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, and the 
'Religion, Economics and Culture' Conference, Rochester, 2005.  The authors are grateful to 
participants at these venues, to  two anonymous referees, and the Editors of Development and Change 
for their valuable comments.   Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies. 
**
 Corresponding author: School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, 
Northern Ireland BT37 0QB, United Kingdom (VK.Borooah@ulster.ac.uk). 
1. Introduction 
In response to the burden of social stigma and economic backwardness borne by 
persons belonging to some of India‟s castes, the Constitution of India allows for 
special provisions for members of these castes. Articles 341 and 342 include a list of 
castes and tribes entitled to such provisions and all those groups included in this list – 
and subsequent modifications to this list – are referred to as, respectively,  “Scheduled 
Castes” (SC) and “Scheduled Tribes” (ST)1.    
These special provisions have taken two main forms. The first is action against 
adverse discrimination towards persons from the SC and the ST.  The second is 
compensatory discrimination in favour of persons from the SC and the ST. 
Compensatory discrimination has taken the form of guaranteeing seats in national and 
state legislatures and in village panchayats, places in educational institutions, and the 
reservation of a certain proportion of government jobs for the SC and the ST.   
In the mind of the Indian public it is jobs reservation that is seen as the most 
important of the public concessions towards the SC and the ST and it is the one which 
arouses the strongest of passions.
2
 On the one hand, there is the demand to extend 
reservation to persons who are not from the SC or the ST but who, nevertheless, 
belong to economic and socially backward groups - the 'other backward classes' 
                         
1
 Reservation for SC were designed to assist groups who had known centuries of suppression; 
reservation for ST were designed to assist groups who were traditionally isolated from the modern 
world and from mainstream society. For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in 
India see Osborne (2001).  
2
 In arriving at this judgement about who should be eligible for reservation, the criterion has been a 
person‟s caste rather than his/her income or wealth. Consequently, groups belonging to what Article 
115 of the Indian Constitution calls “socially and educationally backward classes” have benefited from 
reservation even though, in practice, many persons belonging to these classes could not be regarded as 
“socially and educationally backward”;  at the same time, many persons belonging to non-backward 
classes could legitimately be regarded as “socially and educationally backward”.   Compounding this 
anomaly is that many of the benefits of reservation have been captured by well-off groups from the 
depressed classes (for example, chamars ) while poorer groups (for example, bhangis) have failed to 
 2 
(OBC)
3
.  On the other hand, there is the demand from the SC and the ST to extend 
reservation to private sector jobs
4
.  
Sowell (2003) has remarked that “as the country with the longest history of 
preferences and quotas for the purpose of advancing poor and disadvantaged groups, 
India‟s experience is particularly relevant to the actual consequences of such 
programs, as distinguished from their hopes and consequences” (p. 48).  Against this 
observation, and the fact that the India‟s 50 year old experiment with affirmative 
action has been emulated in other countries (Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka), the 
purpose of this paper is to investigate, using data from the 55
th
 round (1999-2000) of 
the National Sample Survey (Government of India, 2000), the extent to which jobs 
reservation for the SC and the ST have benefited persons from these groups in the 
sense of affording them a greater share of regular salaried and wage employment than 
they might have had otherwise.
5
   
The NSS employment and unemployment data give the distribution of its 
respondents - who are distinguished by various characteristics, including their caste, 
religion, and educational standard - between different categories of economic status.  
Of these categories, the three which are the most important are: self-employed; 
regular salaried or wage employees; and casual wage labourers.  Using these data,  
                                                                      
benefit. Unfortunately, we are unable to address this issue in this study since the data do not allow a 
breakdown of the SC by sub-caste. 
3
 Article 340 of the Indian Constitution empowers the government to create such classes and in 1955, 
following the report of the “Kalelkar” Commission, 2,339 groups were designated as belonging to the 
OBC.  The 1980 report of the “Mandal” Commission recommended that, in addition to the 23 percent 
of government jobs reserved for the SC and ST, a further 27 percent be reserved for the OBC.   In 
1990, the V.P. Singh announced plans to implement this recommendation triggering a wave of “anti-
Mandal” rioting in India. In 1992, India‟s Supreme Court, in Sawhney v The Union of India, upheld 
jobs reservation for the OBC but ruled that: (i) reservation was not to extend to more than 50 percent of 
the population and (ii) that groups within the OBC category who were manifestly not disadvantaged 
(the “creamy layer”) were to be excluded from reservation.        
4
 See Bhambri (2005); Thorat (2005). 
 3 
we focused on prime-age (25-45 years of age) males and estimated, using the methods 
of multinomial logit, the probabilities of men being in these categories of 
employment, after controlling for their caste/religion
6
 and their employment-related 
attributes.
7
   
These probabilities were then used to decompose the difference between "group 
X" and forward caste Hindus in the proportions of their members in regular salaried or 
wage employment.
8
  This decomposition allowed us to assign a proportion of this 
(overall) difference to “attribute differences” between the group X and forward caste 
Hindus – i.e. the outcome difference when the different attributes of group X and 
forward caste Hindus were evaluated using a common coefficient vector
9
 ; the rest of 
the overall difference was then due to “coefficient differences” i.e. the outcome 
difference in when the attributes of group X  were evaluated, first using the coefficient 
vector of group X and, then, using the coefficient vector of forward caste Hindus.
10
 
The proportionate contributions of the attributes and the coefficients differences, to 
the overall difference, are termed, respectively, the attributes contribution and the 
coefficients contribution.  
                                                                      
5
 The NSS is an annual survey of households in India with a large survey, covering issues of 
employment etc., conducted every five years.   
6
 The caste/religion groups considered are: ST (Christian); ST (non-Christian); SC; OBC (Muslim); 
OBC (non-Muslim); forward caste Hindus (non-OBC/SC/ST Hindus); Muslims (non-OBC/SC/ST);  
Christian (non-OBC/SC/ST); Sikhs (non-OBC/SC/ST). 
7
 The choice of prime-age males was influenced by the fact that very large proportion of these men 
were likely to be active in the labour market in the sense of  being either employed or seeking 
employment. 
8
 forward caste Hindus were Hindus who were not included in the OBC/SC/ST categories. However, 
since the designation of groups in the OBC category is a state responsibility a particular (caste) group 
may be included in the OBC category in one state (i.e. be excluded from  forward caste Hindus) but be 
excluded from the OBC category in another state (i.e. be included in  forward caste Hindus).  
9
 Which could be the coefficient vector of either group X or forward caste Hindus. 
10
  Alternatively, the attributes of forward caste Hindus could be evaluated, first using the coefficient 
vector of group X and, then, using the coefficient vector of forward caste Hindus. 
 4 
The proportion of the (overall) difference, in the proportions of their members in 
regular salaried and wage employment, between forward caste Hindus and persons in 
group X which is due to “coefficient differences” (the coefficients contribution)  may 
be interpreted as a measure of “discrimination” against such persons.   
If  this difference is positive – the proportion of persons in regular salaried and 
wage employment is higher when the attributes of group X are evaluated using its 
own coefficients than the coefficients of forward caste Hindus – then discrimination 
works in favour of group X;  on the other hand,  if this difference is negative – the 
proportion of persons in regular salaried and wage employment is smaller when the 
attributes of group X are evaluated using its own coefficients than the coefficients of 
forward caste Hindus – then discrimination works against group X.  Given that 
employers might be expected to have a preference for employing forward caste 
Hindus, compared to persons from the SC or the ST,
11
 jobs reservation policies in 
favour of applicants from the SC and ST might be expected to blunt discrimination 
against SC/ST applicants and, possibly, even reverse it. 
This study attempts to evaluate the amount by which jobs reservation has 
benefited persons from the SC and ST in giving them a higher share of regular 
salaried and wage employment than they might have had in the absence of jobs 
reservation.  It is impossible to evaluate this directly since jobs reservation is an all-
India policy and we cannot distinguish between parts of the country where the policy 
operated and parts where it did not.  However, we can answer this question indirectly 
by considering a group whose members, though as deprived and poorly qualified as 
                         
11
 This preference might be engendered by a distaste for persons from such groups (bigotry: Becker, 
1971) or by a belief that employees from such groups were inferior workers (statistical discrimination: 
Phelps, 1972). 
 5 
those from the SC and the ST, do not benefit from jobs reservation.  This group 
consists of Muslims from the OBC.   
A recent committee set up by the Prime Minister of India to look at employment 
among Muslims found that, despite constituting 14.7 percent of India‟s population, 
Muslims comprised only a fraction  of India‟s workforce; furthermore, in terms of 
educational achievement, Muslims were also falling behind persons from the SC and 
the ST.
12
 Consequently, it seemed reasonable to regard Muslims from the OBC as 
representing what the employment position of persons from the SC and ST might have 
been if they had not had the shelter of jobs reservation. 
2.  Some Methodological Qualifications  
This method of measuring discrimination against, or for, group X, described 
above, needs to be qualified in, at least, three respects.  First, note that discrimination 
is computed conditional upon a given set of attributes.  If these attributes are added to, 
or subtracted from, then the degree of discrimination would also change.  For 
example, if better data on educational qualifications became available, then the degree 
of discrimination computed from the new data would be different from the original 
estimate.  So, there is no unique degree of discrimination. 
Second, even if one could establish a definitive vector of relevant attributes, an 
unique degree of discrimination might still not be established.  This is because the 
attributes contribution could be computed using either the coefficients of group X or 
the coefficients of forward caste Hindus and the two methods may not yield the same 
result.  There is nothing in the methodology to suggest that one computation is to be 
preferred over the other.  Consequently, the coefficients difference – computed as the 
                         
12
 The Guardian, 5 April 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/india/story/0,,1747079,00.html. 
 6 
difference between the overall difference and the contribution of attributes difference 
- would be different depending upon how the attributes contribution was computed.
13
  
So, for this reason also, there is no unique degree of discrimination. 
Third, the methodology assumes a one-way relation between attributes and 
employment outcomes.  For example, exogenously given high (low) educational 
qualifications are likely to lead to good (bad) employment outcomes.  This assumed 
exogeneity of qualifications might be justified at a point in time but, with a broader 
time frame, it is plausible that past good/bad employment outcomes in the past  
contribute to present high/low educational qualifications. In other words, there is a 
two-way relation between qualifications and employment outcomes: qualifications 
influence employment outcomes but employment outcomes also influence 
qualifications. 
To put it differently, the degree of discrimination as measured by our 
methodology measures discrimination at a point in time, conditional on a given set of 
attributes.  But the poor attributes of the members of a group may be the result of past 
discrimination against such persons: the fact that members of a group were denied 
good jobs in the past was a barrier to their acquiring good educational qualifications 
and this resulted in their inability to secure good jobs today.  Consequently, it needs to 
be emphasised that the degree of discrimination measured in this study will 
necessarily understate the “true” (i.e. historical), but unknown, degree of 
discrimination.               
                         
13
 An equivalent way of expressing is that the coefficient difference may be computed either by 
evaluating the attributes of group X or by evaluating  the attributes of forward caste Hindus using the 
two different coefficient vectors.  
 7 
3.  Economic Status, Education and Community  
Table 1 shows, on the basis of data for the 55
th
 round of the NSS, the distribution 
of  77,535 men, between the ages of 25 and 45 years ("prime-age" males), and living 
in the 16 major states of India and the Union Territory of Delhi, by their educational 
standard, between the  following categories of economic status
14
: 
1. Own account workers (self-employed) 
2. Unpaid family workers 
3. Regular salaried or wage workers 
4. Casual wage labourers 
5. Employers 
6. Seeking and/or available for work 
Of these six categories, the first four were the main categories of economic status 
for prime-age men: 29,787 of the 77,535 men (38 percent) were own account workers;  
17,314 men (22 percent of the total) were regular salaried or wage workers; 19,296 
men  (25 percent of the total) were casual labourers; and 8,476 men (11 percent of the 
total) were unpaid family workers.   
Being a casual labourer or an own account worker was largely the preserve of 
poorly educated men while regular salaried or wage workers were largely drawn from 
the ranks of the better educated: of the 19,296 prime-age men who were casual wage 
labourers, 92 percent had an education standard less than secondary school and 49 
percent were illiterate; of the 29,787 men who were own account workers, 69 percent 
                         
14
 Excluded from this analysis were 2,359 prime-age males who were: attending educational 
institutions (655 men); attending domestic duties, and/or producing goods and services for household 
use (for example, serving, tailoring, weaving), and/or engaged in free collection of goods - for example, 
vegetables, roots, firewood, cattle feed (310 men); rentiers, pensioners, and remittance recipients (175 
 8 
had an education standard less than secondary school and 25 percent were illiterate;  
on the other hand, of the 17,314 prime-age men who were regular salaried or wage 
workers, 61 percent were educated to secondary (or above) and 27 percent were 
graduates (or above). 
This study implicitly assumes that becoming a regular salaried or wage worker 
was the most desirable outcome for prime-aged men and, compared to that, self 
employment or casual wage labour were inferior outcomes.  One can cite many 
justifications for this assumption.  First, as referred to already, the Prime Minister of 
India has set up a high-powered committee to look at minority employment and, in 
particular, to examine why Muslims comprise only a fraction of India‟s workforce.  
Second, this assumption is  also consistent with evidence from the field: for example, 
Jeffery and Jeffery (1997) in their study of Muslims in Bijnor argued that many 
Muslims regarded their relative economic weakness as stemming from their being 
excluded from jobs due to discriminatory practices in hiring. The belief that their sons 
would not get jobs then led Muslim parents to devalue the importance of education as 
an instrument of upward economic mobility.
15
   
        A striking feature of Table 1 is how few men were seeking, and/or available 
for, work: only 1,639 men (2 per cent of the total) were unemployed in the 
conventional meaning of the term.  Moreover, job search appeared to be the 
prerogative of better educated men: of the 1,639 "unemployed" men, 76 percent were 
educated to secondary level or above and 40 percent were graduates or postgraduates.  
                                                                      
men); unable to work owing to a disability (448 men); beggars and prostitutes (42 men); and "others" 
(729 men). 
15
 However, there may be cases where self employment is the preferred outcome over the available 
choices.  We are unable to take account of such preferences because all we observe is the outcome and 
not the reasons for the outcome. 
 9 
Table 2 shows the distribution of prime-age men across the categories of 
economic status by religion and caste.  Since nearly one in ten persons from the OBC 
were Muslim, they are identified, in this study, separately from the non-Muslims 
(mostly Hindu, but some Sikhs) of the OBC.  Table 2 clearly shows that OBC prime-
age males were different from those belonging to the SC in two important respects.  
First, both Muslim and non-Muslim OBC men were more likely to be in self 
employment (45 and 41 percent respectively) than men from the SC (28 percent).  
Second, both Muslim and non-Muslim OBC men were less likely to work as casual 
labourers (27 and 25 percent respectively) than men from the SC (47 percent).    
Prime-age males from the OBC also differed from their forward caste Hindu
16
 
counterparts in two important respects.  First, forward caste Hindu men were more 
likely to be in regular salaried or wage employment (32 percent) than OBC men (19 
percent of non-Muslim, and 15 percent of Muslim, OBC men).  Second, forward caste 
Hindu men were even less likely to work as casual labourers (10 percent) than men 
from the OBC.   
Consequently, if one was to establish a hierarchy of communities, in terms of the 
"desirability" of the economic status of their prime-age men, then the SC and the non-
Christian ST, a large proportion of  whose men were casual labourers, would lie at the 
bottom; forward caste Hindus, with one third of their men in regular salaried or wage 
employment, and only one tenth of their men working as casual labourers, would be at 
the top; and sandwiched between them would be the OBC (non-Muslim and Muslim) 
and (non-OBC) Muslims. 
                         
16
 Hindus who did not belong to the SC/ST or to the OBC. 
 10 
Lastly, Table 3 shows the education standards of prime-age men from the different 
communities.  Non-Christian men from the ST, along with men from the SC, had the 
lowest level of educational achievement: 52 percent of the former and 43 percent of 
the latter were illiterate.  They were followed by Christian men from the ST (35 
percent of whom were illiterate) and Muslims (35 percent of Muslims from the OBC, 
and 33 percent of non-OBC Muslims, were illiterate).  The best educated men were 
forward caste Hindus and (non-ST) Christians: only 10 percent of Hindu, and only 6 
percent of Christian, prime-age men were illiterate while 24 percent of Hindu, and 18 
percent of Christian, prime-age men were graduates.     
4.  A Multinomial Logit Model of Economic Status Outcomes 
The multinomial logit model has been used to analyse occupational outcomes 
by inter alia:  Schmidt and Strauss (1975); Borooah (2001); and Borooah and Mangan 
(2002). The basic question that such a model seeks to answer is: what is the 
probability that a person with a particular set of characteristics, will be found in  a 
specific category of economic status (hereafter, simply 'status')?  These answers 
obtained by estimating the multinomial logit equation where the dependent variable Yi 
took the values, 1, 2, or 3, depending upon whether person i was self employed (own-
account worker); a regular salaried or wage worker; a casual wage labourer.
17
  In 
                         
17 With J mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive outcomes, indexed 1…J,  the multinomial 
logit model is defined by a pair of equations.  The first, defines the log odds ratio of a person i  being in 
status  j>1, relative to being in the „base‟ status  j=1, as a linear function of { ,  1... }ikX k K iX , the 
vector of values of K explanatory variables ( 1 1iX  ) for the person: 
1
Pr( )
log
Pr( 1)
K
i
jk ik
ki
Y j
X
Y


 
  
 
 i jX β  where: Yi is an integer variable which takes the value j if, and only 
if, outcome j occurs for person i, and jβ is the vector of coefficients associated with outcome j, 1j  
being the coefficient associated with the intercept term.  The second equation defines the probability  of 
outcome j (j=1…J) occurring for individual i as:
1
Pr( ) exp( ) /[1 ] ( )
J
i ij ir
r
Y j Z Z F

    i jX β   
 11 
essence, with self employment (Yi =1) as the base category, the model consisted of 
two equations (Yi =2, Yi =3) each of which took the following form:  
 
Pr( )
log (landholding, social group, education, state, sector) + error
Pr( 1)
i
i
Y j
f
Y
 
 
 
  
Table 4 shows the results of estimating a multinomial logit model for 66,397 
prime-age men who were in non-family employment, that is in one of the following 
(mutually exclusive) categories of economic status: own account workers; regular 
salaried or wage employment; casual wage labourers.  Excluded from the analysis 
were: 1,023 prime-age men who were employers, 8,476 prime-age men who were 
unpaid family workers, and 1,639 men who were searching and/or available for work.  
The coefficient estimates shown in Table 4 are to be interpreted as the change in the 
log risk-ratios, 
Pr( )
log
Pr( 1)
i
i
Y j
Y
 
 
 
, consequent upon a unit change in the value of the 
associated variable  
A positive coefficient implies that the ratio increases and a negative coefficient 
implies that it decreases
18
.  Because the community and the education standard 
categories (see Table 4 for a full listing), in addition to being mutually exhaustive, 
were also collectively exhaustive, one of the communities, and one of the education 
standards, had to be omitted from the equation in order to avoid multicollinearity in 
the presence of the intercept term: forward caste Hindus and “illiteracy” were the two 
omitted or residual categories.  The variables relating to the included communities and 
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 However, the direction of change in the probability of an outcome, consequent upon a unit change in 
ik
X , cannot be inferred from the sign of 
jk
 .  The reason is that, in a multinomial model, a change in 
the value of a variable for a person changes the probability of every outcome for him/her.  Since these 
changes are constrained to sum to zero, whether the probability of a particular outcome goes up or 
down depends on what happens to the probabilities of the other outcomes. 
 12 
education standards were binary variables, taking the value 1 if a man belonged to that 
community, or had that standard of education, and zero if he did not. 
As observed earlier, the signs of the coefficient estimates associated with a 
variable - which, consequent upon a unit change in the value of the variable, reflect 
the directions of change in the risk-ratios - do not predict the directions of change in 
the probabilities of the outcomes.  The changes in the probabilities of the outcomes, 
following a change in the value of a variable, are the marginal probabilities 
associated with that variable.
19
  These marginal probabilities are shown in the right 
hand panel of Table 4.  
The effects of changing the value of a dummy variable - as are all the variables 
in Table 7 - are analysed by comparing the probabilities when the dummy variable 
takes the value of the 'reference' group with the probabilities that result from the 
dummy variable taking the value relevant to another group, the values of all the other 
variables being held constant at their mean values. 
4.1 Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes 
For example, the marginal probabilities against the SC group in Table 4 are 
obtained as the difference between the probabilities (of the three outcomes) if 
everyone belonged to the SC and the probabilities if everyone was a forward caste 
Hindu, the values of the other variables (size of land owner, age, education standard) 
held at their mean values.  The results suggest that the probability of being self 
employed would fall by 0.08 points
20
 and  the probability of being a casual wage 
labourer would rise by 0.10 points.  
                         
19
 Defined as 
Pr( )i
ik
Y j
X
 

 
20
 Remembering that the probabilities lie between 0 and 1. 
 13 
The pattern of marginal probabilities for the (non-Muslim) OBC was similar to 
that of the SC: relative to forward caste Hindus, the probability of being in self 
employment fell, and the probability of being a casual wage labourer rose, for both 
groups. However, compared to the SC group, the marginal probabilities for the (non-
Muslim) OBC show that the fall in the probability of self employment, and the rise in 
the probability being casual wage labourers, was much smaller but the fall in the 
probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment was greater.    
4.2 Muslims 
In contrast to the SC (and the non-Muslim OBC), the pattern of marginal 
probabilities for Muslims, whether from the OBC or not, was similar: relative to 
forward caste Hindus, the probabilities of being in self employment and of being 
casual wage labourers rose, and the probability of being in regular salaried or wage 
employment fell, for both groups.  The marginal probabilities for (non Other 
Backward Caste) Muslims
21
, suggest that the probability of being self employed 
would rise by 0.032 points and the probability of being in regular salaried or wage 
employment would fall by 0.053 points.  The rise in the probability of self 
employment was much higher for Other Backward Caste Muslims, compared to non 
OBC Muslims (0.064 against 0.032), but the fall in the probability of being in regular 
salaried or wage employment more precipitous (0.073 against 0.053), for the former, 
compared to the latter, group. 
                         
21
 The difference between the probabilities (of the three outcomes) if everyone was a (non-OBC) 
Muslim and the probabilities if everyone was a forward caste Hindu, the values of the other variables 
(size of land owner, age, education standard) held at their mean values. 
 14 
4.3 Christians and  Scheduled Tribes   
 The pattern of marginal probabilities associated with non-Christian persons 
from the ST were very similar to that for Scheduled Caste persons: relative to forward 
caste Hindus, the probabilities of being in self employment fell  by 0.162 points non-
Christian persons from the ST (compared to a fall of 0.194 points for persons from the 
SC), and the probabilities of being in casual wage labourer rose by 0.184 points 
(compared to a rise of 0.201 points for persons from the SC); by contrast, the fall in 
the probability of being in self-employment (0.078 points) and the rise in the 
probability of being in casual, wage labour (0.104 points) was much more muted for 
Christian persons from the ST.  
 By contrast, non-tribal Christians  had a greater propensity for salaried 
employment than forward caste Hindus: relative to forward caste Hindus, the 
probabilities of non-tribal Christians being in salaried employment  rose by 0.053 
points the probability of being self employed fell by 0.066 points.  
4.4 Education Standards 
The marginal probabilities associated with the education standards show that, 
relative to illiteracy, rising education standards lowered the probabilities of being self 
employed or a casual wage labourer and increased the probability of being in regular 
salaried or wage employment.  Compared to illiterate prime-age men, this culminated 
in graduate prime-age males having probabilities of being: in regular salaried or wage 
employment, 0.5 points higher; casual wage labourers, 0.272 points lower; self 
employed, 0.229 points lower.   
Improvements in the standard of education led to progressively greater 
increases in the probability of being in regular salaried or wage employment.  Self 
 15 
employment could be regarded as the next most desirable outcome and being a casual 
wage labourer as the least desirable.  Improvements in the standard of education led to 
a fall in the probabilities of being self employed and being a casual wage labourer but, 
with improvements in the education standard,  the fall in the probability of being a 
casual wage labourer was considerably greater than the fall in the probability of being 
self employed. 
5.  The Decomposition of Probabilities: Salaried and Wage 
Employment 
 
The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) method of decomposing group 
differences in means into an “explained” and a “residual” component has been 
extended to explaining group differences in probabilities, derived from models of 
discrete choice with binary outcomes, by Gomulka and Stern (1990); Blackaby et. al. 
(1997,1998,1999); and by Nielsen (1998).  This methodology can be extended, as 
shown in Borooah (2005), to models of discrete choice with multiple (i.e. more than 
two) outcomes. 
The Decomposition of Probabilities: Salaried and Wage Employment 
 As observed earlier, regular salaried or wage employment could be regarded 
as the most desirable of the three categories of economic status analysed, the other 
two being self employment and casual wage labourer.   Table 5 and 6 show the 
decomposition of the difference between "community X" and forward caste Hindus in 
the proportions of their members in regular salaried or wage employment.  We 
illustrate the discussion by considering Muslims and the SC. 
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Muslims and Scheduled Castes 
 The column headed 'sample average' in Tables 5 and 6 shows that 19.4 percent 
of prime-age males from the SC, compared to 38.7 percent of forward caste Hindu 
men, were in regular salaried or wage employment - a difference of 19.3 points.  The 
same column shows that 22.3 percent of non OBC Muslims, and 17.6 percent of 
Muslims from the OBC, were in salaried or wage employment.  So, compared to 
forward caste Hindus, both the SC and Muslims suffered from an (salaried) 
"employment deficit".  Among Muslims, those from the OBC were in greater deficit 
than non-OBC Muslims.    
The next column of Table 5 shows that if forward caste Hindu attributes had 
been evaluated at SC coefficients ('group s treated a group r'), 40.7 percent of  forward 
caste Hindu men would have been in regular salaried or wage employment - 2 points 
above the observed Hindu proportion of 38.7 percent.  On the other hand, if Hindu 
attributes had been evaluated at (non OBC) Muslim coefficients, 33.3 percent of 
forward caste Hindu men would have been in regular salaried or wage employment – 
5.4 points below the observed Hindu proportion of 38.7 percent.  Lastly, if Hindu 
attributes had been evaluated at (OBC) Muslim coefficients, 30.9 percent of forward 
caste Hindu men would have been in regular salaried or wage employment – 7.8 
points below the observed Hindu proportion of 38.7 percent.   
Since forward caste Hindus would have had a higher probability of salaried 
employment if they had been treated as SC, and a lower probability if they had been 
treated as Muslims, SC coefficients were more favourable, and Muslim coefficients 
were less favourable, to securing regular salaried or wage employment, compared to 
the coefficients for forward caste Hindus.  Given that employers might be expected to 
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have a preference for employing forward caste Hindus, compared to Muslims and 
persons from the SC, jobs reservation policies in favour of applicants from the SC 
were strong enough to reverse employer bias against this group, at least as far as 
prime-age men were concerned.  However, since such policies did not extend to 
Muslims they did not receive protection from any employer bias against them.         
Table 6 (community X treated as Hindus) shows that if Muslims had been 
treated as Hindus, their probability of being in salaried employment would have risen 
from 22.3 percent to 26.9 percent for Muslims not from the OBC, and from 17.6 
percent to 23.5.0 percent for Muslims from the OBC.  In other words, this implies a 
coefficients bias against both groups of Muslims and confirms the anti-Muslim 
coefficients bias suggested  by the results of Table 5. However, if prime-age men 
from the SC had been treated as Hindus, their probability of being in salaried 
employment would have risen from 19.4 percent to 20.5 percent (Table 6) implying a 
slight coefficients bias against the SC in contrast to the slight pro-SC coefficients bias 
suggested by Table 5.  
Employment Deficit and Surplus Groups 
Table 5 and 6 shows that the following seven groups  were in "employment 
deficit" vis-à-vis forward caste Hindus meaning that the proportion of prime-age 
males from these groups who were in regular salaried or wage employment was less 
than the corresponding proportion of forward caste Hindus:  
1. ST (Christian)  
2. ST (non-Christian)  
3. SC  
4. OBC (non-Muslim)  
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5. OBC (Muslim)  
6. Muslims (not from the OBC) 
7. Sikhs 
Of these groups, the first three benefited from jobs reservation policies while the 
latter four did not.  This is reflected in the fact that only a very small proportion of the 
employment deficit for the first three could be explained by coefficient bias.  For 
example, as Tables 5 and 7 (“Hindus treated as belonging to community X”) show, of 
the total employment gap of 0.217 points between Christian ST and forward caste 
Hindus, only 6 percent (0.013 points out of 0.217) could be attributed to coefficients 
bias the remainder (94 percent) being due to the relatively inferior attributes of 
Christian men from the ST.  Tables 5 and 7 (“Hindus treated as community X”) shows 
that, for the SC and the non-Christian ST, jobs reservation was sufficient to overcome 
any discriminatory bias against these groups so as to give them a coefficients 
advantage vis-à-vis forward caste Hindus; Tables 6 and 8 (“community X treated as 
Hindus”) show that, for the SC and the non-Christian ST, jobs reservation meant that 
only a small proportion (around 5 percent) of the employment deficit, relative to 
forward caste Hindus, could be ascribed to coefficient disadvantage.   
 Notwithstanding this advantage, the proportion of non-Christian prime-age men 
from the ST, and prime-age men from the SC, in regular salaried or wage employment 
(respectively, 14.0 and 19.4 percent) was much lower than the 38.7 percent  of 
forward caste Hindu men so employed.  This entire difference, as Tables 7 and 8 
show, could be ascribed to the relative lack of employment-friendly attributes (mostly, 
lower educational achievements) among men from the SC and (non-Christian) from 
the ST.  Table 3 pointed to the gulf in education standards between these two groups 
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on the one hand and forward caste Hindus on the other.
22
  Given this gulf, current 
demands in India for extending, for example, jobs reservation for the SC and the ST to 
the private sector are misplaced: further improvements in coefficients bias towards 
these groups will do little to improve their effectiveness as employees; on the other 
hand, strengthening their, currently weak, employment-friendly attributes will.            
Tables 7 and 8 show that of the groups which were in employment deficit, and 
which did not benefit from jobs reservation policies, non-Muslim OBC had the 
smallest deficit (16.1 points), followed by Muslims not from the OBC (16.4 points), 
followed by Muslims from the OBC (21.1 points).  Tables  7 and 8 also allow one to 
deduce for these groups how much of their employment deficit was due to coefficients 
bias against them and how much was due to the fact that their attributes were less 
employment-friendly than those of forward caste Hindus.   
Table 7 (“Hindus treated as community X”) shows that only 11 percent of the 
employment deficit of  non-Muslim prime-age men from the OBC (1.8 points out of 
16.1) could be blamed on coefficient bias, attribute disadvantage accounting for the 
remaining 89 percent; Table 8 (“community X treated as Hindus”) computes these 
proportions as 12 and 88 percent, respectively.   However, from Table 7, 33 percent of 
the employment deficit of Muslims not from the OBC (Table 5: 5.4 points out of 
16.4), and 37 percent of the employment deficit of Muslims from the OBC (Table 5: 
7.8 points out of 21.1), could be blamed on coefficients bias
23
; Table 8 computes these 
proportions as 28 percent for both groups.   So, in the light of the Mandal 
Commission's Report to extend reservation to members of the OBC, and subsequent 
debate surrounding it, our analysis shows that the extension of jobs reservation to all 
                         
22
 See Borooah and Iyer (2005) for a discussion of school enrolments in India by community. 
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persons from the OBC (90 percent of whom are not Muslims) is misplaced: it is all 
Muslims, whether from the OBC or not, rather than non-Muslims belonging to the 
OBC that need protection from adverse coefficients bias. 
The one group which was in employment surplus, vis-à-vis forward caste Hindus, 
was (non-Tribal) Christians.
24
  Tables 7 and 8 show that of the difference of 5.3 points 
between the employment rates of Christian and forward caste Hindu men, almost all 
could be attributed to the coefficient bias (entirely unaided by any jobs reservation) 
towards Christian men. 
6.  The Effectiveness of Jobs Reservation for the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes  
 
The purpose of reserving a certain proportion of jobs for members of a particular 
group is to enable a greater proportion of its members to be in employment than 
would have been possible without such reservation.  In the absence of reservation, the 
reluctance of employers to hire persons from certain groups - whether through "taste 
based" or "statistical" discrimination - would mean that ceteris paribus job seekers 
from disfavoured groups would be relatively less successful in finding jobs.  For 
example, Tables 7 and 8 show that, relative to forward caste Hindus, Muslim men 
faced quite severe coefficients bias: purely on account of their religion, the probability 
of Muslim men being in regular salaried or wage employment was lower than that of 
forward caste Hindus.  
But even without coefficient bias, low levels of education and poor qualifications 
within a community would mean that only a small proportion of its members would 
                                                                      
23
 The remainder, of course, being due to attributes disadvantage. 
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 That is, the proportion of prime-age males from these groups who were in regular salaried 
employment was greater than the corresponding proportion of forward caste Hindus.  
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succeed in securing salaried employment. For example, Table 6 shows that if the 
attributes of prime-age Muslim men from the OBC were evaluated using forward 
caste Hindu coefficients (i.e. one abstracted from coefficients bias) only 23.5 percent 
of Muslims, compared to 38.7 percent  forward caste Hindus, would be in regular 
salaried or wage employment.  
Jobs reservation cannot alter the employment-related attributes of the SC and the 
ST but, given those attributes, it can raise the proportion of  persons from these 
groups who secure regular salaried or wage employment, i.e. it can shift coefficient 
bias in favour of these groups.  In order to see how effective jobs reservation was in 
raising the proportions of prime-age men from the SC and the ST in regular salaried 
or wage employment we consider what these proportions would have been if the 
attributes of these men had been evaluated using the coefficients of employment-deficit 
groups who did not benefit from jobs reservation: Muslims from the OBC; Muslims 
not from the OBC; and non-Muslims from the OBC.  
If prime-age men from the SC had been treated as Muslims from the OBC, the 
proportion of men from the SC in regular salaried or wage employment would have 
fallen from the observed 19.4 percent to 15.2 percent.  Under the same scenario (i.e. 
treating as Muslims from the OBC), the proportion of non-Christian men from the ST 
in regular salaried or wage employment would have fallen from the observed 14.0 
percent to 11.1 percent, and the proportion of Christian men from the ST in regular 
salaried or wage employment would have fallen from the observed 17.1 percent to 
13.6 percent.   So, as far as prime-age men from the SC and non-Christian men from 
the ST were concerned, jobs reservation raised their proportions in regular salaried or 
wage employment by at most 4 percentage points.   
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Conversely, if groups who are currently not offered jobs reservation for their 
members were to be brought under the jobs reservation umbrella then it is likely that 
their proportions in regular salaried and wage employment would rise: our 
calculations show that if Muslims from the OBC were to be offered jobs reservation 
then their proportion in regular salaried and wage employment would rise from 17.6 
percent to about 21 percent. For non-OBC Muslims, the rise would be from 22.3 
percent to about 25 percent.  So, again, the benefit of jobs reservation to Muslims 
would be around 3-4 percent. 
An alternative way of raising the proportion of prime-age men from the SC 
and from the ST in regular salaried or wage employment would have been to improve 
their employment-related attributes, but without reserving jobs for them.  Our 
calculations suggest that: 
 
1. If prime-age men from the SC had had the education standards of non-
Muslim men from the OBC (shown in Table 3), their proportion in regular 
salaried or wage employment would have been 24.4 percent instead of the 
observed 19.4 percent: a rise of 5 points  which could be ascribed to the 
rise in the education standard of men from the SC to the standard of  non-
Muslims from the OBC. 
2. If prime-age men from the SC had had the education standards of non-
OBC Muslims (shown in Table 3), their proportion in regular salaried or 
wage employment would have been 21.7 percent instead of the observed 
19.4 percent.  This rise of 2 points could be ascribed to the rise in the 
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education standard of men from the SC to the standard of non-OBC 
Muslims. 
3. If prime-age men from the SC had had the education standards of Muslim 
men from the OBC (shown in Table 3), their proportion in regular salaried 
or wage employment would have been 20.7 percent instead of the 
observed 19.4 percent – a rise of just one point.   
 
7.  Conclusions 
 The goal of jobs reservation in India has been to bring about an improvement 
in the welfare of those who are, and have been for a long time, economically and 
socially depressed.   This paper attempt to quantify the effects of reserving jobs in 
India for persons from the SC and ST.  Our conclusion is that jobs reservation 
succeeded in raising the representation of persons from the SC and ST, in regular 
salaried and wage employment, by about 5 percentage points.  This figure was arrived 
at by comparing their current representation in such jobs with what it would have 
been had they been treated as OBC Muslims.  Of course, it could be argued that, in 
the absence of jobs reservation, the representation of persons from the SC and the ST 
in regular salaried and wage employment might have been even lower than that of 
OBC Muslims and that, therefore, the estimated gain of 5 points underestimates the 
true gain from jobs reservation policies.  We concede this point and regard jobs 
reservation as having delivered a gain of at least 5 points, in regular salaried and wage 
employment, to persons from the SC and ST in the share of regular salaried and wage 
employment. 
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 Our second conclusion is that the extension of jobs reservation policies to 
persons from the OBC is misconceived.  As argued earlier, only 11 percent of the 
employment deficit which non-Muslim OBC males faced, relative to forward caste 
Hindus, could be ascribed to coefficient bias (“discrimination”); one the other hand, 
between 33-37 percent of the employment deficit faced by Muslims could be ascribed 
to discrimination.  So, if the object of jobs reservation is to correct for discriminatory 
bias in the jobs market, and if reservation is to be extended beyond the SC and ST, 
then Muslims have a more compelling case than persons from the non-Muslim OBC.   
 Our last conclusion is that jobs reservation policies placed little emphasis on 
improving the job-related attributes of persons from the SC and ST.  Given the  gulf in 
educational standards between forward caste Hindus and persons from the SC and ST, 
to which we have drawn attention, another prong of policy could, indeed should, 
focus on improving the educational standards of  SC and ST persons.  This needs to 
be more than reserving places in Management, Engineering, and Medical schools for 
persons.  Such reservation, in the context of the general backwardness of the SC and 
ST communities, is little more than a cosmetic exercise, confined to urban areas, and 
assisting members of these groups who are least in need of help.  
The root of the problem lies in the many dysfunctional primary and secondary 
schools, in the villages and towns of India, characterised by an absence of learning 
materials, teachers, and, sometimes, even classrooms.  It is in these schools that 
learning is stifled for the millions of children. Compounding the problem of 
dysfunctional schools is the poverty of parents, many of whom are from the SC and 
the ST, who cannot afford to keep children on at school; indeed, given the poor 
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quality of schooling that their children receive, they see no reason for making 
sacrifices for their children‟s education. 
Admittedly, tackling the problem at its roots will only yield results after a long 
delay.  Nor does the emphasis on effective learning at school carry the glamour 
associated with being a putative graduate of the Indian Institute of Technology, the 
Indian Institute of  Management, or the All-India Medical Institute.  But, before the 
vast mass of educationally and economically deprived children in India can 
meaningfully enter the portals of Universities and Institutes of Higher Education  they 
need to go to good schools. 
 26 
 References 
Becker, G.S. (1971), The Economics of Discrimination,  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
  
Bhambri, C.P. (2005), “Reservations and Casteism”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
vol. XL, No. 9, pp. 806-08. 
 
Blackaby, D.H., Drinkwater, S., Leslie, D.G., Murphy, P.D. (1997), “A Picture of 
Male Unemployment Among Britain‟s Ethnic Minorities”,  Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 182-197. 
 
Blackaby, D.H., Leslie, D.G., Murphy, P.D. and O‟Leary, N.C. (1998), “The Ethnic 
wage Gap and Employment Differentials in the 1990s: Evidence for Britain”, 
Economics Letters, vol. 58, pp. 97-103. 
 
Blackaby, D.H., Leslie, D.G., Murphy, P.D. and O‟Leary, N.C. (1999), 
“Unemployment Among Britain‟s Ethnic Minorities”, The Manchester School, vol. 
67, No. 1, pp. 1-20. 
 
Blinder, A.S. (1973), “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural 
Estimates”, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 436-455. 
 
Borooah, V.K. (2001), “How do Employees of Ethnic Origin Fare on the 
Occupational Ladder in Britain?”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 48, No. 
1, pp.1-26. 
 
Borooah, V.K. and Mangan, J. (2002), “An Analysis of Occupational Outcomes for 
Indigenous and Asian Employees in Australia”, Economic Record, vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 
1-19. 
 
Borooah, V.K. (2005), "Caste, Inequality and Poverty in India", Review of 
Development Economics vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 399-414.  
 
Borooah, V.K. and Iyer, S. (2005), "Vidya, Veda, and Varna: The Influence of 
Religion and Caste on Education in Rural India", Journal of Development Studies, 
vol. 41, No. 8, pp. 1369-1404. 
 
Gomulka, J. and Stern, N. (1990), “The Employment of  Married Women in the 
United Kingdom, 1970-83”, Economica, vol. 57, Issue 226, pp. 171-199. 
 
Jeffery, R. and Jeffery, P. (1997), Population, Gender and Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Government of India (2000), National Sample Survey 55
th
 Round, National Sample 
Survey Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, New 
Delhi. 
 
 27 
Nielsen, H.S. (1998), “Discrimination and Detailed Decomposition in a Logit Model”, 
Economics Letters,  vol. 61, pp. 115-20.  
 
Oaxaca, R. (1973), “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets”, 
International Economic Review, vol. 14, Issue 3, pp. 693-709. 
 
Osborne, E. (2001), “Culture, Development and Government”, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 659-85. 
 
Phelps, E.S. (1972), “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism”, American 
Economic Review, vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 25-43. 
 
Schmidt, P. and Strauss, R.P. (1975), “The Prediction of Occupation Using Multiple 
Logit Models”,  International Economic Review, vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 471-86. 
 
Sowell, T. (2003), Affirmative Action Around the World: an Empirical Study, Yale 
University Press, New Haven:    
 
Thorat, S.K. (2005), “Reservation and Efficiency: Myth and Reality”, Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. XL, No. 9, pp. 808-10.   
 
 28 
Table 1: Economic Status and Educational Standards of Men between 25 
and 45 years of age (1999-00) 
 Illiterate Literate, 
but below 
primary 
Primary or 
Middle 
Secondary Graduate Total 
       
SE 7,385 3,535 9,570 6,478 2,819 29,787  
 24.79 11.87 32.13 21.75 9.46 100.00  
 37.05 41.52 42.73 37.66 29.70 38.42  
EMP 78 64 322 352 207 1,023  
 7.62 6.26 31.48 34.41 20.23 100.00  
 0.39 0.75 1.44 2.05 2.18 1.32  
UFW 1,507 727 2,776 2,514 952 8,476  
 17.78 8.58 32.75 29.66 11.23 100.00  
 7.56 8.54 12.40 14.61 10.03 10.93  
RSWW 1,417 1,095 4,248 5,843 4,711 17,314  
 8.18 6.32 24.54 33.75 27.21 100.00  
 7.11 12.86 18.97 33.97 49.63 22.33  
CWW  9,505 3,040 5,188 1,421 142 19,296  
 49.26 15.75 26.89 7.36 0.74 100.00  
 47.68 35.71 23.17 8.26 1.50 24.89  
SKW 41 52 290 595 661 1,639  
 2.50 3.17 17.69 36.30 40.33 100.00  
 0.21 0.61 1.29 3.46 6.96 2.11  
Total 19,933 8,513 22,394 17,203 9,492 77,535  
 25.71 10.98 28.88 22.19 12.24 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Notes to Table 1: 
SE=self-employed; EMP=employer; RSWW=regular salaried or wage worker; 
CWW=casual wage worker; SKW=seeking work. 
First figure in column is total in caste/religion category; second 
figure is row percentage; third figure is column percentage. 
Source: NSS 55th Round 
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Table 2: Economic Status and Caste/Religion of Men between 25 and 45 
years of age (1999-00) 
 SE EMP UPFW RSWW CWL SKW Total 
ST(non-Christian) 1,982 18 522 713 2,401 51 5,687  
 34.85 0.32 9.18 12.54 42.22 0.90 100.00  
 6.65 1.76 6.16 4.12 12.44 3.11 7.33  
ST(Christian) 149 1 34 50 95 6 335  
 44.48 0.30 10.15 14.93 28.36 1.79 100.00  
 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.29 0.49 0.37 0.43  
SC 3,477 42 628 2,267 5,919 212 12,545  
 27.72 0.33 5.01 18.07 47.18 1.69 100.00  
 11.67 4.11 7.41 13.09 30.67 12.93 16.18  
OBC(non-Muslim) 9,904 308 3,012 4,656 6,073 386 24,339  
 40.69 1.27 12.38 19.13 24.95 1.59 100.00  
 33.25 30.11 35.54 26.89 31.47 23.55 31.39  
OBC(Muslim) 1,222 60 245 416 728 46 2,717  
 44.98 2.21 9.02 15.31 26.79 1.69 100.00  
 4.10 5.87 2.89 2.40 3.77 2.81 3.50  
Hindu (non-
ST/SC/OBC) 
9,350 451 3,157 7,430 2,410 754 23,552  
 39.70 1.91 13.40 31.55 10.23 3.20 100.00  
 31.39 44.09 37.25 42.91 12.49 46.00 30.38  
Muslim (non-
ST/SC/OBC)  
2,927 77 484 1,254 1,450 134 6,326  
 46.27 1.22 7.65 19.82 22.92 2.12 100.00  
 9.83 7.53 5.71 7.24 7.51 8.18 8.16  
Christian (non-
ST/SC/OBC) 
200 46 37 296 176 35 790  
 25.32 5.82 4.68 37.47 22.28 4.43 100.00  
 0.67 4.50 0.44 1.71 0.91 2.14 1.02  
Sikh (non-
ST/SC/OBC) 
576 20 357 232 44 15 1,244  
 46.30 1.61 28.70 18.65 3.54 1.21 100.00  
 1.93 1.96 4.21 1.34 0.23 0.92 1.60  
Total 29,787 1,023 8,476 17,314 19,296 1,639 77,535  
 38.42 1.32 10.93 22.33 24.89 2.11 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Notes to Table 2: 
SE=self-employed; EMP=employer; RSWW=regular salaried or wage worker; 
CWW=casual wage worker; SKW=seeking work. 
First figure in column is total in caste/religion category; second 
figure is row percentage; third figure is column percentage. 
Source: NSS 55th Round 
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Table 3: Education Standard and Caste/Religion of Men between 25 and 
45 years of age (1999-00) 
 Illiterate Literate, 
but below 
primary 
Primary 
or Middle 
Secondary Graduate Total 
       
ST(non-Christian) 2,630 705 1,066 508 187 5,096  
 51.61 13.83 20.92 9.97 3.67 100.00  
 14.37 9.19 5.61 3.70 2.44 7.68  
ST(Christian) 103 40 87 46 18 294  
 35.03 13.61 29.59 15.65 6.12 100.00  
 0.56 0.52 0.46 0.33 0.23 0.44  
SC 5,007 1,627 3,113 1,401 515 11,663  
 42.93 13.95 26.69 12.01 4.42 100.00  
 27.35 21.21 16.38 10.20 6.71 17.57  
OBC(non-Muslim) 5,764 2,550 6,601 4,106 1,612 20,633  
 27.94 12.36 31.99 19.90 7.81 100.00  
 31.49 33.25 34.73 29.88 21.01 31.08  
OBC(Muslim) 818 338 778 337 95 2,366  
 34.57 14.29 32.88 14.24 4.02 100.00  
 4.47 4.41 4.09 2.45 1.24 3.56  
Hindu (non-
ST/SC/OBC) 
1,926 1,434 5,253 5,978 4,599 19,190  
 10.04 7.47 27.37 31.15 23.97 100.00  
 10.52 18.70 27.64 43.50 59.95 28.90  
Muslim (non-
ST/SC/OBC)  
1,845 876 1,638 866 406 5,631  
 32.77 15.56 29.09 15.38 7.21 100.00  
 10.08 11.42 8.62 6.30 5.29 8.48  
Christian (non-
ST/SC/OBC) 
42 31 251 225 123 672  
 6.25 4.61 37.35 33.48 18.30 100.00  
 0.23 0.40 1.32 1.64 1.60 1.01  
Sikh (non-
ST/SC/OBC) 
172 69 219 275 117 852  
 20.19 8.10 25.70 32.28 13.73 100.00  
 0.94 0.90 1.15 2.00 1.53 1.28  
Total 18,307 7,670 19,006 13,742 7,672 66,397  
 27.57 11.55 28.62 20.70 11.55 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Notes to Table 3 
First figure in column is total in caste/religion category; second 
figure is row percentage; third figure is column percentage. 
Source: NSS 55th Round  
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Estimates from the Economic Status 
Equations   
 Coefficients Marginal Probabilities 
 Salaried/ 
Wage 
Employee 
Casual 
Wage 
Labourer 
Own-
Account 
Worker 
Salaried/ 
Wage 
Employee 
Casual 
Wage 
Labourer 
Land-ownership 
(default: no land) 
     
Land owner: < 0.22 
hectares 
-0.663*** 0.037 .0795816             
.414959 
-.1175316 
.414959 
.03795             
.414959 
 (24.70) (1.21)    
Land owner: 0.22-1.13 
hectares 
-1.389*** -1.040*** .2719407 
.187102 
-.1685166 
.187102 
-.1034241             
.187102 
 (34.28) (27.60)    
Land Land owner: > 
1.13 hectares 
-1.786*** -2.733*** .4140371  
.149706 
-.1790548    
.149706 
-.2349823             
.149706 
 (42.41) (53.30)    
Age  
(default: 25-30 
years) 
     
Age: 30-35 years -0.106*** -0.420*** .0606146 
.246758 
.0001679             
.246758 
-.0607826             
.246758 
 (3.59) (14.63)    
Age: 36-40 years -0.064** -0.657*** .0782168 
.23968 
.0174179 
.23968 
-.0956346              
.23968 
 (2.16) (22.27)    
Age: 41-45 years 0.059* -0.773*** .0689083 
.19778 
.0444713 
.19778 
-.1133797              
.19778 
 (1.91) (24.12)    
Caste/Religion 
(default: forward 
caste Hindu) 
     
Scheduled Tribe 
(Christian) 
0.032 0.558*** -.0782456 
.004428 
-.0266047 
.004428 
.1048502             
.004428 
 (0.18) (3.67)    
Scheduled Tribe (non-
Christian) 
0.240*** 0.997*** -.1623687 
.07675 
-.0221732 
.07675 
.1845419              
.07675 
 (4.43) (21.80)    
Scheduled Caste 0.378*** 1.150*** -.1947364 
.175656 
-.0058437 
.175656 
.2005802             
.175656 
 (10.38) (31.55)    
OBC (non-muslim) -0.039 0.353*** -.037822 
.310752 
-.0250212 
.310752 
.0628432             
.310752 
 (1.35) (10.50)    
OBC (muslim) -0.472*** -0.072 .0643618 
.035634 
-.07252 
.035634 
.0081582             
.035634 
 (7.11) (1.18)    
Muslim (not from OBC) -0.309*** 0.039 .03246 
.084808 
-.0535366 
.084808 
.0210766             
.084808 
 (7.29) (0.88)    
Christian (not from 
ST) 
0.331*** 0.188 -.066322 
.010121 
.0532096             
.010121 
.0131124             
.010121 
 (3.13) (1.54)    
Sikh (Muslim (not 
from Scheduled or 
OBC) 
-0.237** -0.582*** .0921356 
.012832 
-.0188713             
.012832 
-.073264           
.012832 
 (2.38) (3.34)    
      
Education 
(default: illiterate) 
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Literate, below 
primary level 
chooling 
0.325*** -0.429*** -.0056342 
.115517 
.0837835             
.115517 
-.0781493             
.115517 
 (6.83) (12.79)    
Primary or Middle 
level schooling 
0.594*** -0.852*** -.0042796 
.286248 
.1553775             
.286248 
-.1510979             
.286248 
 (16.06) (30.55)    
Secondary or higher 
secondary level 
schooling 
1.263*** -1.603*** -.0975748 
.206967 
.334675             
.206967 
-.2371002             
.206967 
 (33.44) (42.09)    
Graduate 1.872*** -2.844*** -.2286226 
.115547 
.5002508             
.115547 
-.2716283             
.115547 
 (44.27) (31.35)    
 
State 
(default: Tamil Nadu) 
     
Andhra Pradesh -0.335*** -0.402*** .0882061 
.082534 
-.0404441             
.082534 
-.047762            
.082534 
 (6.08) (7.24)    
Assam -0.000 -0.866*** .0788976 
.048602 
.0334961             
.048602 
-.1123937             
.048602 
 (0.00) (13.14)    
Bihar -1.025*** -0.633*** .1890193 
.090817 
-.1285824             
.090817 
-.0604369             
.090817 
 (17.14) (11.96)    
Gujarat -0.321*** -0.007 .0396594 
.052126 
-.0530456             
.052126 
.0133862            
.052126 
 (5.24) (0.11)    
Haryana -0.384*** -1.067*** .1508621 
.020091 
-.0313588             
.020091 
-.1195033             
.020091 
 (4.68) (10.82)    
Himachal Pradesh 0.120 -0.378*** .0208385 
.020438 
.0400447             
.020438 
-.0608832             
.020438 
 (1.50) (4.01)    
Karnataka -0.229*** 0.091 .016414 
.051011 
-.0431166             
.051011 
.0267026            
.051011 
 (3.66) (1.45)    
Kerala -0.083 0.851*** -.1133187 
.039053 
-.0633782             
.039053 
.1766969            
.039053 
 (1.15) (12.53)    
Madhya Pradesh -0.465*** -0.118** .0701054 
.081901 
-.070636             
.081901 
.0005306             
.081901 
 (8.15) (2.10)    
Maharashtra 0.153*** 0.044 -.0254925 
.086284 
.0260668             
.086284 
-.0005742             
.086284 
 (2.88) (0.75)    
Orissa -0.257*** -0.287*** .0656652 
.04321 
-.0318415              
.04321 
-.0338237             
.04321 
 (3.63) (4.42)    
Punjab -0.144** -0.956*** .1079706 
.03949 
.0084701              
.03949 
-.1164407              
.03949 
 (2.09) (12.42)    
Rajasthan -0.365*** -1.005*** .1451541 
.051297 
-.0286173             
.051297 
-.1165367             
.051297 
 (5.87) (14.66)    
Uttar Pradesh -0.801*** -1.215*** .2217999 
.124991 
-.0887599             
.124991 
-.13304           
.124991 
 (15.66) (23.05)    
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West Bengal -0.662*** -0.635*** .151791 
.081465 
-.0825483             
.081465 
-.0692427             
.081465 
 (11.66) (11.08)    
Delhi -0.154* -1.390*** .1322383 
.013736 
.0147418             
.013736 
-.1469801             
.013736 
 (1.80) (8.98)    
Sector 
(default: rural) 
     
Urban 0.492*** -1.080*** .0611228 
0.3779 
.1420136             
0.3779 
-.2031364             
0.3779 
 (17.70) (38.88)    
Constant -1.062*** 2.581***    
 (13.49) (33.79)    
Observations 66,397 66,397    
Pseudo-R2 0.2505 0.2505    
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Significant marginal probabilities in bold 
In each marginal probability cell: the figure in the first row is the 
marginal probability, prob/x; the figure in the second row is the 
mean value of x, the relevant variable.
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Table 5: The Decomposition of Inter-Community Differences  
in the Proportion of Prime-Age Men in Regular Salaried and Wage 
Employment: Hindus treated as Community X  
 Sample 
Average 
Group s treated as group r 
 r sP P  ˆ( )
ˆ( )
P
P
s
s
r
s
X ,β
X ,β
 
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
P
P
r
s
r
r
X ,β
X ,β
 
r=Scheduled Tribe (Christian) 
s='forward caste' Hindus  
0.170 - 0.387 = -0.217 0.374 - 0.387 = -0.013 0.170 - 0.374 = -0.204 
r= Scheduled Tribe (non-
Christian) 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.140 - 0.387 = -0.247 0.391 - 0.387 = 0.004 0.140 - 0.391 = -0.251 
r= SC 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.194 - 0.387 = -0.193 0.407 - 0.387 = 0.02  0.194 - 0.407 = -0.213 
r= OBC (Muslim) 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.176 - 0.387 = -0.211 0.309 - 0.387 = -0.078 0.176 - 0.309 = -0.133 
r= OBC (non-Muslim) 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.226 - 0.387 = -0.161 0.369 - 0.387 =  -0.018 0.226 - 0.369 = -0.143 
r= Muslims 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.223 - 0.387 = -0.164 0.333 - 0.387 = -0.054  0.223 - 0.333 = -0.11 
r= Christians 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.440 - 0.387 = 0.053 0.440 - 0.387 = 0.053 0.440 - 0.440 = -0.0 
r= Sikhs 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.272 - 0.387 = -0.115 0.359 - 0.387 = -0.028 0.272 - 0.359 = -0.087 
 
 
Table 6: The Decomposition of Inter-Community Differences  
in the Proportion of Prime-Age Men in Regular Salaried and Wage 
Employment: Community X treated as Hindus   
 Sample 
Average 
Group s treated as group r 
 r sP P  ˆ( )
ˆ( )
P
P
r
r
r
s
X ,β
X ,β
 
ˆ( )
ˆ( )
P
P
r
s
s
s
X ,β
X ,β
 
r=Scheduled Tribe (Christian) 
s='forward caste' Hindus  
0.170 - 0.387 = -0.217 0.170 - 0.184 = -0.014 0.184 - 0.387 = -0.203 
r= Scheduled Tribe (non-
Christian) 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.140 - 0.387 = -0.247 0.140 - 0.153 = -0.013 0.153- 0.387 = -0.234 
r= SC 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.194 - 0.387 = -0.193 0.194 - 0.205 = -0.011 0.205 - 0.387 = -0.182 
r= OBC (Muslim) 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.176 - 0.387 = -0.211 0.176 - 0.235 = -0.059  0.235 - 0.387 = -0.152 
r= OBC (non-Muslim) 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.226 - 0.387 = -0.161 0.226 - 0.245 = -0.019 0.245 - 0.387 = -0.142 
r= Muslims 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.223 - 0.387 = -0.164 0.223 - 0.269 =  -0.046 0.269 - 0.387 = -0.118 
r= Christians 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.440 - 0.387 = 0.053 0.440 - 0.392 = 0.048 0.392 - 0.387 = -0.005 
r= Sikhs 
s='forward caste' Hindus 
0.272 - 0.387 = -0.115 0.272 - 0.302 =- 0.03 0.302 - 0.387 = -0.03 
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Table 7: Coefficient and Attribute Contributions to Differences Between Hindus 
and Others in Their Respective Proportions in Regular Salaried and Wage 
Employment  
Community X Hindu attributes evaluated using X’s coefficients  
 Observed 
Difference 
%  Due to 
Coefficient 
Differences 
% Difference Due 
to Attribute  
Differences 
Scheduled Tribe 
(Christian) 
-0.217 6 94 
Scheduled Tribe 
(non-Christian) 
-0.247 -2 102 
SC -0.193 -10 110 
OBC (Muslim) -0.211 37 63 
OBC (non-
Muslim) 
-0.161 12 88 
Muslims -0.164 33 67 
Christians 0.053 100 0 
Sikhs -0.115 24 76 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Coefficient and Attribute Contributions to Differences Between Hindus 
and Others in Their Respective Proportions in Regular Salaried and Wage 
Employment  
Community X Community X attributes evaluated using Hindu coefficients  
 Observed 
Difference 
%  Due to 
Coefficient 
Differences 
% Difference Due 
to Attribute  
Differences 
Scheduled Tribe 
(Christian) 
-0.217 6 94 
Scheduled Tribe 
(non-Christian) 
-0.247 5 95 
SC -0.193 6 94 
OBC (Muslim) -0.211 28 72 
OBC (non-
Muslim) 
-0.161 11 89 
Muslims -0.164 28 72 
Christians 0.053 91 9 
Sikhs -0.115 26 74 
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